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MILITARY SERVICES CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Recommendation (Page 137):

"That the National Security Council revise NSCID No. 5 to provide for clandestine intelligence activity on the part of the military services consistent with their capabilities and statutory responsibilities under the National Security Act of 1947."

Department of Defense Position:

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1. Comment:

This recommendation reflects the strong and unanimous views of the services. It involves a fundamental issue within the intelligence community. NSCID No. 5 has been interpreted as assigning to CIA the exclusive right to control and conduct covert foreign intelligence operations. Such activities as the services have been allowed to conduct during the past 7 or 8 years in this important field even in war theaters have been essentially on the sufferance of CIA. Meanwhile, however, CIA's record of performance in covert intelligence operations of direct interest to the mission of the Armed Services has been disappointing, particularly against primary Soviet orbit intelligence targets. The services, which consider that they have generally a longer record of experience in this work, are convinced that they can produce through covert operations more effectively than CIA various needed categories of intelligence related to their particular missions and requirements.

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The Agreed Activities paper (DCID No. 5/8) represents a cautious compromise, which is not altogether satisfactory to the services. It provides for a measure of participation by them in covert operations on a best-qualified basis. The services believe their right to participate should be explicit in a NSCID and not dependent on a subsidiary agreement.

It is too early to judge whether this agreement will prove workable. First steps have been taken by CIA to function under the agreement, and the services are proceeding to strengthen their covert collection resources. Each side tends to be wary of the other, and more generosity and good will than has been shown in the past will be necessary if the present tentative arrangement is to work.

Monitorship over this problem has been assigned to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) who has been directed to keep the developments under continuing review. If events develop favorably under the Agreed Activities paper, revision of NSCID No. 5 may prove to be unnecessary.

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**TOP SECRET**Recommendation (Page 204):

"That under the terms of the 'Agreed Activities' paper, the services expand their clandestine collection efforts with primary emphasis focused on targets in the Soviet Union and Communist China. Personnel and funds to accomplish this objective should be made available to the military intelligence services."

Department of Defense Position:

1. Concur.
2. Comments: The satellites, including areas of SE Asia, should be added to the primary target area.

Recommendation (Page 204):

"That the intelligence community establish adequate and positive measures for the identification and listing of all clandestine operators, as provided in the IAC Directive No. 54 approved July 24, 1952. Mutual trust regarding the divulgence of intelligence sources should be cultivated within the community."

Department of Defense Position:

1. Concur.
2. Comment: An effort has been made under the provisions of this directive to create a national source control mechanism. It is probable that the recommendation can be implemented effectively on some clearly mutual basis such as rotating chairmanship of the source control mechanism.

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d. Each agency that can contribute to and profit from the defector program should be given the scope to do so.

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achieve greater flexibility and permit more extensive prior training of assigned personnel."

Recommendation (Page 156):

"That the Navy expand its collection effort."

Recommendation (Page 178):

"That the Air Attache System be maintained at a level which will insure an adequate collection capability and that air attache qualifications, such as background, interest, and language training be commensurate with the collection potential of the station."

Department of Defense Position:

1. Concur, subject to the following comments.
2. Comments:

The Department of Defense concurs that there should be full scope for realization of the intelligence potential of the Attache System. It does not agree with the view that present ceilings on attache strength are seriously inhibitive. The Department of Defense ceilings on attache strength are flexible, and increases in requirements on the Attache System (such as opening new attache offices in Vienna) are met by corresponding raises in the ceilings.

The Department of Defense has prescribed a measure of consolidation and simplification of functions in attache offices, which are being gradually put into effect by the services. Others will be directed shortly, for there is still scope for considerable streamlining of administration and reporting. These measures will operate to reduce markedly the attache man-hours now devoted to overhead functions, and are designed to free attaches for more attention to their primary intelligence task.

Meanwhile elements of OSD are studying ways of improving the selection and training of attaches.

CONCENTRATION ON THE PRIMARY TARGET

Recommendation (Page 244):

"That positive measures be taken to increase the quantity and improve the quality of information collected, with special emphasis on the primary target area, to include the revision of existing directives to assign more explicit responsibility to agencies which can fulfill the requirement."

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Department of Defense Position:

1. Concur.
2. Comment:

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Recommendation (Page 254):

"That the intelligence community actively give recognition to this primary intelligence target; i.e., the Soviet Union, and take such actions as are necessary to present a concerted effort for the single purpose of breaking this vital intelligence block."

Department of Defense Position:

1. Concur.
2. Comment:

The Task Force is concerned lest too great a relative emphasis be put on secondary intelligence targets, which incidentally do not present such formidable obstacles in intelligence collection as the Soviet orbit targets. It would appear that in some minor respects the Task Force's concern is justified, although generally the service intelligence agencies have their sights set on the primary target.

MILITARY PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTELLIGENCE DUTIES

Recommendation (Page 273):

"That the Department of Defense conduct periodic surveys of service personnel procedures to insure that adequate consideration is being given to the requirements of the intelligence agencies for their share of the best qualified military personnel."

Department of Defense Position:

1. Non-concur.

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**TOP SECRET****2. Comment:**

It is considered that current practices insure a generally equitable distribution within the Department of Defense. It is however particularly desirable that the highest practicable standards be applied to the selection of attache personnel.

**EXEMPTION FROM CIVIL-SERVICE REQUIREMENTS****Recommendation (Page 137):**

"That serious consideration be given by the Army to more extensive use of Schedule 'A' in the employment of civilian analysts and other intelligence specialists in order to provide the necessary flexibility in the recruitment of qualified civilian personnel by the military services and to facilitate the interchange of personnel between the zone of interior competitive service and the overseas excepted service."

**Recommendation (Page 178):**

"That a limited number of civilian personnel spaces for Air Force intelligence be exempt from some civil-service requirements."

**Recommendation (Page 273):**

"That the Department of Defense give serious consideration to more extensive use of Schedule 'A' in the employment of civilian analysts and other intelligence specialists, in order to provide the necessary flexibility in the recruitment of qualified civilian personnel by the military services, and to facilitate the interchange of such personnel between the Zone of Interior competitive service and the overseas excepted service."

**Recommendation (Page 178):**

"That a board or commission be established to make an equitable and coordinated allocation among the intelligence agencies of personnel spaces exempt from some civil-service requirements."

**Department of Defense Position:**

1. Concur, subject to the following comment.

**2. Comment:**

Greater flexibility in hiring and in the ability to shift civilian personnel between the ZI and foreign stations is essential.

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Unrestricted "bumping" in reductions in force can disrupt the civilian cadres of the service intelligence organizations. A degree of relaxation of civil-service regulations is desirable to deal with these problems. The Air Force points out, however, that complete conversion to Schedule "A" could produce undesirable effects on civilian morale through weakening job security.

The Department of Defense has initiated a thorough study into this problem.

#### MISCELLANEOUS RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING PERSONNEL

##### Recommendation (Page 273):

"That the Department of Defense require that the military services study the problem of improving the prestige of the civilian analyst vis-a-vis his military colleagues."

##### Department of Defense Position:

1. Concur, subject to the following comments.
2. Comment:

In practical terms, no easy solution to this very real problem can be imposed. Thoughtful officers of broad experience soon come to realize that as a matter of enlightened self-interest they are well-advised to work to win the backing and loyal respect of their cadre of civilian intelligence experts. Symbols of "second class citizenship" should be avoided, and qualified civilians should be sent out on speaking engagements, as representatives to conferences, etc., interchangeably with equally qualified officers. The active duty tours of civilian analysts who are reserve officers should be planned to provide a maximum refresher and reorientation to over-all service (as against purely intelligence) viewpoints. An ad hoc committee has been studying the problem of language training for appropriate civilian analysts. Thought is being given to assigning qualified civilians to certain types of service school duty which would further their career.

Much has already been done to deal with the elements of this problem, and the Department of Defense will keep it under review.

##### Recommendation (Page 273):

"That the Department of Defense facilitate the employment as intelligence specialist of qualified retired military personnel by initiating action toward amending the laws concerning Federal employ-

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ment of retired military personnel, with a view to removing the present ceiling on the Federal pay of such individuals."

Department of Defense Position:

1. Concur, subject to the following comments.
2. Comments:

The present laws are too restrictive, and exclude many experienced and capable retired officers from civilian intelligence employment. They should be relaxed, and the Civil Service Commission has developed a proposal along these lines. On the other hand, if it became automatically easy for retired officers with intelligence experience to find employment as civilian intelligence analysts, the service intelligence agencies might find themselves seriously embarrassed in finding plausible excuses for turning away the many not particularly gifted retired colonels who would seek such jobs. Some middle ground must be found.

Recommendation (Page 273):

"That the Department of Defense, in the consideration of future economies, give proper weight to the importance of intelligence in peacetime, so as to avoid serious reductions-in-force in our centers of intelligence production."

Department of Defense Position:

1. Concur.
2. Comment:

This recommendation can be further served by applying such reductions-in-force as do occur to overhead positions rather than to basic productive elements. In the past, the reverse has sometimes been the case.

Recommendation (Page 274):

"That the Department of Defense take prompt action to insure that proper consideration in personnel planning is given to the impact of the timelag involved in our present clearance requirements for filling sensitive positions."

Department of Defense Position:

Comment: This recommendation requires further study. A solution for peacetime conditions will be easier to achieve than for mobilization requirements, but the latter situation is much the most critical.

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**TOP SECRET****MEETING EMERGENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR LINGUISTS****Recommendation (Page 137):**

"That the Army aggressively attack the linguist problem by developing and using outside sources for training in universities and colleges through the medium of, for example, its comprehensive ROTC reserve programs."

**Recommendation (Page 273):**

"That the Department of Defense give serious consideration to the exploitation of the ROTC and reserve intelligence programs for language training purposes by offering credit toward reserve commissions and drill credits respectively for the completion of selected language courses."

**Department of Defense Position:**

1. Concur subject to the following comments.
2. Comment:

Considerable use is now being made of civilian facilities for this purpose. However, this problem involves quality rather than quantity, and it is most acute in the case of rare languages for which only the most limited civilian facilities are available.

Emphasis should be laid not so much on turning out large classes of persons with a smattering of foreign languages as on proper selection and thorough training of qualified personnel, and continued maintenance of their language competence after their formal training is finished. The recommendations concerning ROTC language training require thorough study in an effort to determine what special categories of military personnel can usefully be given credit for language work, for it would be unwise to give blanket accreditation regardless of the type of service for which the trainee was destined.

**ATOMIC ENERGY INTELLIGENCE****Recommendation (Page 220):**

"That the Central Intelligence Agency, in the exercise of its responsibilities for coordination of the production of national intelligence, pay special attention to the production of atomic energy intelligence."

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**TOP SECRET**Department of Defense Position:

1. Concur subject to the following comments.
2. Comment:

It is agreed that in its appointed role as coordinator for the production of national intelligence the CIA should pay special attention to the coordination of the production of atomic energy intelligence. The Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) is an adequate instrument for this purpose and is now being so used.

Recommendation (Page 220):

"That the responsibility of the Atomic Energy Commission for intelligence be defined in a National Security Council intelligence directive."

Department of Defense Position:

1. Concur.
2. Comment:

This definition would be of considerable value to the Department of Defense in indicating the extent to which we can expect expert technical aid and guidance from the Atomic Energy Commission.

Recommendation (Page 220):

"That a National Security Council intelligence directive set forth the responsibility, authority, functions, and composition of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee."

Department of Defense Position:

1. Concur subject to the following comment.
2. Comment:

Such a directive is required. However, the JAEIC is a sub-committee of the Intelligence Advisory Committee; hence the directive can be issued as a Director of Central Intelligence Directive.

Recommendation (Page 220):

"That the Atomic Energy Commission define the responsibilities and functions of its Division of Intelligence."

define the responsibilities and functions of its Division of Intelligence."

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Department of Defense Position:

1. Concur.
2. Comment:

Such definition would be of value to the Department of Defense if the responsibilities and functions were amplified to provide optimum use of AEC experts to the Department of Defense.

Recommendation (Page 220):

"That each of the member agencies of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee insure that it is represented on that committee by the best qualified individual available concerning the matter under discussion, and that changes in representation be made as infrequently as practicable."

Department of Defense Position:

1. Concur.
2. Comment:

The Department of Defense will continue to make every effort to insure the fulfillment of this recommendation. Turn-over in service representation in the past has been caused partly by loss of qualified civilian personnel to other government agencies and to private industry, both of which are able to offer higher salaries.

Recommendation (Page 220):

"That there be a thorough review of the processes for development of the atomic energy portions of National Intelligence Estimates to insure, in the first place, that everything practicable is done to develop intelligence regarding intentions, plans programs, policies, doctrine, and capabilities of the Soviet Union with regard to wartime use of atomic energy, and, secondly, that the national intelligence estimates reflect the full extent of available intelligence in these matters."

Department of Defense Position:

1. Concur.
2. Comment:

This proposal would be of value to the Department of Defense particularly if the preceding recommendations concerning the definition of responsibilities and functions were implemented.

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TECHNOLOGICAL IMPROVEMENT, AUTOMATION, AND COMMON SUPPORT

Recommendation (Page 179):

"That mechanical and electronic devices to analyze, classify, file, and produce intelligence information be put into use at the earliest possible moment."

Department of Defense Position:

1. Concur.
2. Comment:

Automation in intelligence production has undoubted value in many fields. Considerable investigation has been conducted along these lines in the Air Force, many of whose problems are particularly suited to automatic handling. The needs of each service should dictate the degree of automation desirable.

Recommendation (Page 179):

"That all possible resources be used to exploit technological means for intelligence collection."

Department of Defense Position:

1. Concur.
2. Comment:

This recommendation is currently receiving attention and is related to the recommendation which follows.

Recommendation (Page 179):

"That an intelligence research center be established under the CIA to guide the total intelligence research program."

Department of Defense Position:

1. Concur subject to the following comment.
2. Comment:

Since each service intelligence agency and CIA now conduct such programs, a common service would certainly be desirable. It is believed, however, that such a joint effort should be under the Director of Central Intelligence acting for the IAC and not under the Central Intelligence Agency. This would encourage a broader participation of all of the intelligence community.

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Recommendation (Page 311):

"That the IAC take positive action to insure that a definite and concerted effort is made to develop new techniques, methods, and equipment for the collection and production of intelligence and insure that a free exchange of information concerning such projects is accomplished within the intelligence community."

Department of Defense Position:

1. Concur.
2. Comment:

Continuing efforts are being devoted to this end. In all cases, full effectiveness can be achieved only with a frank and free interchange of information.

Recommendation (Page 244):

"That an agreed glossary of intelligence terms be produced and reviewed periodically."

Department of Defense Position:

1. Concur.
2. Comment:

Such an agreed glossary would be most useful in eliminating misunderstandings and in simplifying procedures. The IAC should set up a subcommittee to produce it.

Recommendation (Page 305):

"That the Intelligence Advisory Committee consider the adoption of a single index system based on the Intelligence Subject Code now in use by the CIA."

Department of Defense Position:

1. Concur.
2. Comment:

The IAC is currently considering this problem and should in due course arrive at a simple index system suited to all agencies. That now in use by CIA would have to be considerably modified to suit the needs of all agencies concerned.

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RECOMMENDATIONS PERTAINING PARTICULARLY TO THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Recommendation (Page 156):

"That the Navy put its counterintelligence program on a wider base so as to bring its world-wide protection up to an adequate level."

Recommendation (Page 292):

"That the Department of the Navy give due consideration to the requirement for additional competent and trained counterintelligence personnel in order to provide adequate security of its personnel and facilities."

Department of Defense Position:

1. Concur subject to the following comments.

2. Comment:

The actual method of expansion should be further investigated. A uni-service expansion of the naval counterintelligence function would probably necessitate additional administrative support. It may, however, be possible to institute cross-servicing among the three military departments.

Recommendation (Page 156):

"That the Navy continue and expand its efforts to improve the intelligence consciousness at all ranks and levels of the department."

Department of Defense Position:

1. Concur.

2. Comment:

In addition to the various regional training schools and intelligence centers, instruction on the mission and role of intelligence is included in the curricula of line schools at all levels.

RECOMMENDATIONS PERTAINING PARTICULARLY TO THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

Recommendation (Page 179):

"That a board be established [within the Air Force] for the supervision of security declassification of material or information."

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**TOP SECRET**Department of Defense Position:

1. Non-concur.
2. Comment:

It is considered that this recommendation requires further examination. Such a procedure could lead to a cumbersome and counterproductive process. Current assignment of responsibility to the office of primary interest appears adequate.

Recommendation (Page 179):

"That a periodic examination be made of Air Force intelligence publications to assure justification for both the publication and distribution thereof."

Department of Defense Position:

1. Concur.
2. Comment:

The action recommended is currently under implementation. It is considered that such action should be taken on a tri-service basis under Department of Defense supervision. Action to this end is being initiated.

Recommendation (Page 179):

"That the use of 'overflights' to secure vital information receive constant consideration."

Department of Defense Position:

1. Concur.
2. Comment:

This recommendation requires, of course, the constant support of other U.S. government agencies if full results are to be achieved. Upon resolution of some of the details involved, it may be advisable to seek NEC action.

ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION OF SERVICE INTELLIGENCE CHIEFSRecommendation (Page 137):

"That the [Army] Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, be elevated to the level of Deputy Chief of Staff."

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Recommendation (Page 178):

"That the organizational position of the Director of Intelligence of the Air Force be raised from its present position to that of a Deputy Chief of Staff."

Department of Defense Position:

1. Non-concur.
2. Comment:

The top staff organization of the Army, only recently introduced, is the result of balanced consideration of all its aspects. It would appear premature to alter this organization, especially since legislative action would be necessary to meet the Task Force's recommendation. The Air Force suggests deferring action on the recommendation in its case. It is noted that the Task Force made no recommendation respecting the position of the Director of Naval Intelligence. If action appears warranted later, it would be desirable to coordinate it on a joint basis, so that the intelligence chiefs of the three services remain in essentially analogous positions in each service staff in relation to each other.

SECURITY

Recommendation (Page 137):

"That a policy be established [by the Army] and measures be instituted for the periodic security rechecking of personnel assigned in sensitive areas at intervals not to exceed five years."

Recommendation (Page 156):

"That the Navy establish a policy and finalize plans for the periodic review of the security status of intelligence personnel who come within the provisions of Executive Order 10450."

Recommendation (Page 179):

"That the Department of the Air Force develop adequate procedures for the periodic security review of personnel occupying sensitive positions."

Recommendation (Page 283):

"That measures be instituted in all agencies to recheck the security status of all personnel engaged in intelligence activities at periodic intervals not to exceed five years in any individual case."

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Recommendation (Page 283):

"That any individual employed in an intelligence organization about whom sufficient doubt concerning his security has been raised during the conduct of an investigation--although the investigation is still in process--should be removed from employment pending final determination of his case. Findings and proposed disposition of those cases which were reported as still in process at the time the survey by this task force was concluded should be reported to the President."

Department of Defense Position:

1. Concur subject to the following comments.
2. Comment:

It is considered that the current security practices and the procedures for acting on adverse information essentially fulfill the objectives of these recommendations. Within the objectives, however, it is desirable to leave to each individual service reasonable latitude in the method of implementation. In the case of the last recommendation, for example, it may in some cases aid the investigation not to alert the individual involved by suspending him. Measures are taken, of course, in such cases to insure that classified information is adequately safeguarded. This general subject will be reviewed in order to insure that the underlying objectives of these recommendations are adequately served.

COORDINATION IN OVERSEAS AREAS

Recommendation (Page 309):

"That senior military commanders in the field be given greater flexibility in their use of information on a need-to-know basis, giving due regard to the protection of its source."

Department of Defense Position:

1. Concur.
2. Comment:

It is considered that current practices in the Department of Defense are satisfactory within the regulations imposed by other agencies.

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**TOP SECRET**OFFICE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONSRecommendation (Page 94):

"That Directive 5105.7 be examined carefully, particularly with respect to Section III, 'Responsibilities', with a view to clarifying it and eliminating any ambiguities which could lead to a misinterpretation of the functions and misapplication of authority of the Office of Special Operations. It is also recommended that the relationships of the OSO with the intelligence organization of the JCS and the military departments be more specifically spelled out so as to reduce the possibilities of friction and misunderstanding with respect to the responsibilities assigned under the National Security Act of 1947, as amended."

Department of Defense Position:

1. Concur subject to the following comment.
2. Comment.

The recommendation reflects a certain uneasiness on the part of the services with a new form of intelligence monitorship. It is not considered that the directive referred to is ambiguous. However, continuing attention will be given to the operations of OSO under this directive.

"WATCH-DOG" COMMISSIONRecommendation (Page 317):

"That a small, permanent, bipartisan commission, composed of members of both Houses of the Congress and other public-spirited citizens commanding the utmost national respect and confidence, be established by Act of Congress to make periodic surveys of the agencies handling foreign intelligence operations; and to report, under adequate security safeguards, its findings and recommendations to the Congress, and to the President, annually and at such other times as may be necessary or advisable. The proposed "watch-dog" commission should be empowered by law to demand and receive any information it needs for its own use. It would be patterned after the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (Hoover Commission). Appointments by the President of persons from private life to the proposed commission should be made from a select list of distinguished individuals of unquestioned loyalty, integrity, and ability, with records of unselfish service to the nation."

Department of Defense Position:

1. Concur.
2. Comment:

Such a commission should afford improved protection for, as well as efficiency in, foreign intelligence operations.

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